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I. INTRODUCTION 
What drives the choice of European law as a field of study and 
scholarship? For many, the answer rests in the puzzle of the 
emergence of a powerful rule of law in a political system that, for all 
intents and purposes, began in the anarchical international sphere.1 
Through the constitutionalization of the founding treaties, the politics 
of state power and national interest have been replaced by the rule-
bound behavior and the equality, predictability, and stability of a 
conventional legal system. In other words, in the eyes of many, the 
European legal system has left behind the shortcomings of public 
international law—most importantly the suspicion that international 
law is not really law at all because the rules are the product of state 
power and mutual interest and, once they no longer serve such ends, 
can be broken with impunity—and has adopted the civilizing 
 
 *  Professor, George Washington University Law School. 
 1. See generally Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a 
Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1981) (delivering the classic 
account of the development of European constitutional law). 
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principles of law in what approximates a federal legal order.2 As this 
characterization suggests, at least part of the attraction of European 
law rests in the fact that constitutionalization presents an empirical 
puzzle with a strong moral dimension.  
While constitutionalization has been at the heart of scholarship in 
law and political science for decades, it has only recently captured 
the attention of legal historians. With their distinct methods and 
sources, they have already contributed in fundamental ways to our 
understanding of the constitutional paradigm, and given the highly 
ambitious research programs of Morten Rasmussen, Bill Davies, and 
others, they will undoubtedly continue to do so. In this essay, I 
review some of their claims and findings from the perspective of the 
legal discipline. In Part II, I argue that historical research has 
uncovered a legal dimension of the constitutionalization process that 
has been missing from the dominant account and that implicitly 
draws on and sheds light upon concepts and theories that are central 
to the field of comparative law. In contrast with the conventional 
account in both the law and political science, which contains a fairly 
thin rendition of the legal process centered on a supranational court 
(the Court of Justice) interpreting a single supranational text (the 
Treaty of Rome), legal historians have documented the variety of 
legal actors and the multiplicity of domestic legal sources that 
combined, through a process of legal transplants, to fashion the 
supranational constitutional apparatus.3 Pluralism and cross-national 
 
 2. See generally Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement 
in Domestic and International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252, 261−70 (2011) (providing 
an overview of the skepticism associated with international law). 
 3. See generally Stein, supra note 1 (analyzing the constitutional doctrines 
developed by the Court of Justice of the European Communities under the Treaty); 
Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, The European Court and the National 
Courts: A Statistical Analysis of Preliminary References, 5 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 66, 
66 (1998) (postulating that European legal integration is the result of connections 
made between the European Court of Justice, national courts, and private litigants); 
J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2413−19 
(1991) (noting that the “constitutionalization” of the European Community’s legal 
structure grew from the establishment of four doctrines by the European Court of 
Justice: the doctrine of direct effect, whereby Community law has direct effect in 
domestic legal systems; the doctrine of supremacy, whereby Community law 
“trumps” national law where the two conflict; the doctrine of implied powers, 
which provides the Community with powers to carry out the tasks given to it under 
the European Economic Community Treaty; and the doctrine of human rights, 
which establishes that the Court will review Community measures to ensure they 
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variation in the types of professionals and institutions responsible for 
crafting the law, as well as the migration of legal concepts between 
jurisdictions, are central themes in the field of comparative law, and 
historical research has revealed the importance of understanding such 
variation and transplantation in the relatively understudied domain of 
public and supranational law.  
In Part III, I argue that the lessons that are sometimes drawn by 
legal historians for contemporary normative and philosophical 
debates on the nature of the European constitutional order are less 
persuasive. It is sometimes argued that, since the process that led to 
the rise of what is alternatively called the “constitutional narrative” 
or “constitutional practice” was more contested and contingent than 
is normally believed to be the case, the existence, today, of a quasi-
federal constitutional order is questionable. To simplify somewhat, 
the claim is that constitutionalization is a story told by a small cadre 
of starry-eyed and ideologically motivated lawyers and that it does 
not reflect the current realities of the member states, which continue 
to privilege national over European law and to give effect to 
European law only sporadically.4 Although there is some support for 
this view, I argue that there is significant countervailing evidence 
and that the constitutional paradigm therefore remains a useful 
framework for conceptualizing European law.  
II. EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY AND 
COMPARATIVE LAW 
In the conventional account of how the doctrinal apparatus and the 
routine practice of the European constitutional order came to be 
established, the legal dimension, namely the institutions, actors, 
sources, and methods that combined to produce the law, is quite thin. 
As Morten Rasmussen narrates in far greater detail, the early legal 
scholarship explained constitutionalization as an authoritative 
process by which the European Court of Justice used the teleological 
method of interpretation to derive direct effect, supremacy, and a 
host of other important doctrines from the text of the Treaty.5 The 
 
are consonant with fundamental human rights). 
 4. Morten Rasmussen, Rewriting the History of European Public Law: The 
New Contribution of Historians, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1187 (2013). 
 5. Id. (providing a historical overview of legal scholarship on European law 
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principal legal actor was the Court, the main source of law was the 
written law of the Treaty, and the dominant interpretive technique 
was the teleological method. The political science scholarship that 
followed beginning in the early 1990s called attention to the 
shortcomings of this legal explanation of constitutionalization—most 
importantly the radical nature and disputed authority of the Court’s 
judgments—and put forward a variety of other factors to explain the 
emergence of the European legal system, including the material 
incentives of market actors and the judiciary’s institutional quest for 
greater power, both the Court of Justice and those national courts that 
allied themselves with the Court of Justice.6 Their contribution was 
to enrich the legal account by including a series of actors—interest 
groups and economic actors—and incentives—institutional power 
and material advancement—external to the profession, reasoning, 
and rule-bound behavior of the law. The law and the process of 
fabricating the law, however, remained the same as in the earlier 
scholarship.  
The recent historical research, by contrast, has expanded our 
understanding of the internal legal dynamics that gave rise to 
constitutionalization in two important ways. First, it has revealed a 
much broader network of legal professionals and legal institutions 
 
and explaining that early scholarship focused primarily on the contributions of the 
ECJ in interpreting the Treaty, by way of the direct effect and supremacy 
doctrines). 
 6. KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE 
MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE (2001) (explaining that 
mutual interest in “European integration, self-empowerment, greater efficiency, or 
the rule of law” motivated national governments to compromise sovereignty in 
favor of a European legal system); Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe 
Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 INT’L ORG. 41, 43 
(1993) (adopting a neofunctionalist view of European Community integration, with 
legal integration as the dependent variable, and the self-interested actions of 
European Community institutions, state governments, and private actors as the 
independent variables); Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, Constructing a 
Supranational Constitution: Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European 
Community, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63, 63 (1998) (arguing for a theory of 
European legal integration that incorporates, “as interdependent causal factors, 
contracting among individuals, third-party dispute resolution, and the production 
of legal norms”); J.H.H. Weiler, A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of 
Justice and Its Interlocutors, 26 COMP. POL. STUD. 510, 512, 532−33 (1994) 
(postulating that acceptance of the constitutional order imposed by the European 
Court of Justice amounted to a “quiet revolution” and arguing that judicial 
empowerment was one reason for this acceptance). 
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involved in shaping the emerging constitutional order, which extends 
well beyond the judges on the European Court of Justice and 
collaborating national courts. Second, it has demonstrated that the 
domestic law of the member states served as a crucial springboard 
for the new law of the European Community, influencing a number 
of key features of the supranational legal order. 
On the first point, recent historical research has shown the 
importance of three groups of legal elites that have been ignored in 
the prevailing account of constitutionalization: executive branch 
lawyers, legal scholars, and the organized bar.  At the supranational 
level, Morten Rasmussen documents in fascinating detail how the 
Commission’s Legal Service (the legal division of the European 
executive branch) promoted an ambitious, federal vision of European 
law with the teleological method of interpretation and how it 
ultimately persuaded the Court of Justice, with a few caveats, to 
adopt this approach.7 Rasmussen, together with others, has also 
chronicled the Legal Service’s efforts to sponsor a pro-integration 
bar and legal academy capable of diffusing and litigating European 
law through its financial and organizational support for national 
professional associations and specialized legal journals.8 As they 
demonstrate, a number of the seminal cases decided by the Court of 
 
 7. See Morten Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of 
European Law: The History of the Legal Service of the European Executive 
1952−65, 21 CONT. EUR. HIST. 375 (2012). 
 8. See id. at 383−84 (explaining that the “professional and academic 
infrastructure . . . had been so sorely missing in the 1950s”); see also Antoine 
Vauchez, The Transnational Politics of Judicialization: Van Gend en Loos and the 
Making of the EU Polity, 16 EUR. L.J. 1, 9−10 (2010) (documenting the Legal 
Service’s support of the Fédération internationale pour le droit européen (FIDE), 
the pan-European lawyers’ association, particularly in analyzing which provisions 
of the European treaties were self-executing); Antoine Vauchez, The Making of the 
European Union’s Constitutional Foundations: The Brokering Role of Legal 
Entrepreneurs and Networks, in TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS IN REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION: GOVERNING EUROPE 1945-83, 108, 115−16 (Wolfram Kaiser et al. 
eds., 2010) (remarking that, while there is no direct evidence to suggest that the 
Legal Service created FIDE, Legal Service officials were active within it, 
ultimately fostering a legal network “located at the crossroads between the national 
and the European levels as much as in-between the various legal, political, 
economic and administrative sites of the EC polity”); Antonin Cohen, 
Constitutionalism Without Constitution: Transnational Elites Between Political 
Mobilization and Legal Expertise in the Making of a Constitution for Europe 
(1940s−1960s), 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 109 (2007) (providing an overview of the 
evolving role of legal professionals and elites in European legal integration). 
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Justice in the 1960s were brought by members of the Dutch 
European law association, and afterwards the judgments of the Court 
were disseminated and publicized through the publication of 
translations, case commentaries, and articles in the newly established 
specialized law journals.9 Thus, at the supranational level, the 
impetus for some of the most important constitutional developments 
came not from the Court but executive branch lawyers, the organized 
bar, and the legal academy. 
In Germany, Bill Davies demonstrates that a different 
constellation of legal elites and institutions was active in resisting 
and ultimately, through the jurisprudence of rights, shaping European 
law.10 There, legal academics were the first to underline the failure of 
the European legal system to guarantee fundamental rights in line 
with the German Basic Law and to voice their opposition to legal 
integration based on the constitutional failures of supranational 
governance. This position was then espoused by the courts, most 
importantly, the Constitutional Court in the Solange case, and 
induced the Commission, Council, and Parliament to issue a joint 
political declaration in favor of rights, as well as to a marked change 
in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice.11 Although German 
executive branch lawyers, both in the Ministry of Justice and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were active in European affairs, they 
carried relatively little weight in the fundamental rights saga. Initially 
exponents of the pro-integration position of the German government, 
they mobilized in favor of rights only once the Constitutional Court 
had ruled and it was necessary to find a political comprise to 
 
 9. See, e.g., Vauchez, supra note 8, at 11−15 (explaining that, despite the “not 
irrelevant variations” in translations, the commentaries and the publication of 
articles by legal elites and parties involved in the case “turned the ambiguous Van 
Gend en Loos into a clear-cut and far-reaching judicial fiat”). 
 10. See BILL DAVIES, RESISTING THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: WEST 
GERMANY’S CONFRONTATION WITH EUROPEAN LAW, 1949−1979, 78−88 (2012) 
(describing the role of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (“FCC”) and 
legal academia in critiquing and arguing rulings and procedural decisions made by 
the FCC and the European Court of Justice “as to the relationship between national 
constitutional law and the European legal system”). 
 11. Bundersverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 
29, 1974, INTERNATIONALE HANDELSGESELLSCHAFT (Solange I), 37 BVerfGE 271 
(Ger.); Bundersverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 
22, 1986, WÜNSCHE HANDELSGESELLSCHAFT (Solange II), 73 BVerfGE 339 
(Ger.). 
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guarantee the cooperation of the German judicial branch. 
France presents yet a different picture. Although there is still 
research to be done, Alexandre Bernier has examined the role of the 
French European law association in the larger context of the legal 
establishment.12 He demonstrates that the pro-integration lawyers and 
academics who banded together in the European law association 
exerted very little influence and that instead the executive branch, 
under the fiercely sovereigntist General De Gaulle, was able to 
control the courts and preserve the largely national bent of French 
law.13 The French courts, lacking the same independence from the 
government and the administration as existed in other member states, 
failed to ally themselves with the Court of Justice in promoting and 
applying European law as courts did elsewhere. Thus, at least in this 
preliminary account and in contrast with Germany, legal academics 
and members of the judiciary played a relatively inconsequential role 
in determining the French attitude toward European law; instead, the 
decisive player was the executive branch.  
In exploring the wide range of legal elites involved in the 
constitutionalization process, together with the considerable variation 
that separated countries like France and Germany, legal historians 
have tapped into an important element of legal systems at the heart of 
the research agenda of comparative law. One of the guiding 
principles of comparative law is that knowledge of a foreign system 
cannot be gained solely by learning the legal rules and principles that 
govern different classes of disputes.14 Not only is the quantity and 
frequency of change of specific rules and principles such that this 
form of knowledge is incomplete and quickly becomes obsolete, but 
 
 12. See Alexandre Bernier, Constructing and Legitimating Transnational Jurist 
Networks and the Making of a Constitutional Practice of European Law, 
1950−1970, 21 CONT. EUR. HIST. 399, 407−14 (2012) (arguing that, although the 
French Association des juristes européens (AJE) succeeded in introducing 
European law to France, it had limited impact in promoting acceptance of 
European law in France due to political and legal constraints, including the 
Euroskeptic Gaullist French administration of the 1960s). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative 
Law (Installment I of II), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 21 (1991) (noting that most legal 
systems do not actually have one “legal rule” to govern each type of dispute and 
that comparative legal scholars must therefore look more broadly at the rule as 
stated in a statute or the constitution, the rule as interpreted by legal scholars, and 
the rule as enforced by courts). 
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their meaning differs radically depending on the legal sources, 
institutions, and the legal professionals that hold sway in the foreign 
system. A considerable portion, if not the bulk, of scholarship in 
comparative law has been dedicated to uncovering these more 
fundamental and persistent differences, and even though this work 
has been criticized for oversimplifying legal traditions, it continues 
to inform teaching and research on the world’s legal systems.15 Thus 
the common wisdom is that the primary source of law in civil law 
jurisdictions is written codes and in common law systems, judge-
made precedent, and that modes of reasoning from these two types of 
sources range from the inductive reasoning of the common law, the 
conceptualist approach of the German and Italian systems, 
parsimonious deduction from the code in France, and the pragmatic 
approach of Scandinavian legal systems.16 More to the point of the 
new historical research on European law, comparative law has 
sought to understand foreign legal systems by uncovering differences 
in the organization and status of the legal professionals called upon 
to interpret and develop the rules.  In some systems, like the English 
common law, the judge occupies pride of place, while in other 
systems, like the German and Italian civil law, the key protagonist is 
 
 15. See RENÉ DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE 
WORLD TODAY 17−29 (2d ed., 1998) (reviewing the “three principal families of 
law existing in the contemporary world,” the Romano-Germanic, common law, 
and socialist legal systems, in addition to “other systems,” including the Muslim, 
Hindu, Jewish, Far East, and Sub-Saharan Africa legal families). See generally 
KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (3d ed., 
1998) (discussing the aims, methods, functions, and history of comparative law; 
surveying the Roman, Germanic, Anglo-American, Nordic, socialist, and “other” 
legal families; and applying comparative law principles to private legal 
institutions); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION (2d ed., 1985) 
(providing an overview of the civil legal systems of Western Europe, Latin 
America, and parts of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East); JOHN P. DAWSON, THE 
ORACLES OF THE LAW (1968) (analyzing the role of case law in shaping the legal 
systems of England, Rome, France, and Germany through examination of the 
relationships between judges and political rulers, the nature and frequency of social 
change, the importance of other legal spokespersons, and the methods for training 
lawyers, in addition to the judgments themselves). 
 16. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 15, at 63−339 (grouping the different styles 
of legal systems into six categories of legal families: Romanistic (France & Italy); 
Germanic (Germany, Austria, and Switzerland); Anglo-American (England and 
United States); Nordic (Scandinavia); socialist; and “other” (Far Eastern, Islamic, 
and Hindu law)). 
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the law professor.17  
Historical research on European law complements this line of 
comparative research on the institutions and elites that wield the 
authority to give meaning to the law in different legal systems by 
shifting the focus from private to public law. For reasons that have 
been thoroughly rehearsed elsewhere, comparative law has 
traditionally been almost exclusively preoccupied with private law—
the law of contracts, torts, property, and so on that governs disputes 
between private parties—and not public law—the law that applies to 
disputes between individuals and state actors such as legislatures and 
government administration.18 The European Community law of the 
1950s and 1960s, in contrast with the conventional focus of 
comparative law, consisted almost entirely of legal guarantees 
designed to curb protectionist state policies and to regulate the 
market in agricultural commodities. Thus, by necessity, the new 
historical research has focused on the legal elites and institutions 
involved in public, not private, law and, in doing so, has improved 
our broader understanding of European legal systems. So far, one of 
the principal contributions has been to illuminate the role of 
government lawyers who, through internal administrative circulars 
and government litigation, had an important part to play in crafting 
the law in the public domain. Taken together, the research discussed 
earlier shows that these government lawyers and civil servants were 
highly influential at the supranational level, and, it appears, in 
France, but less so in Germany. Another lesson that can be drawn 
from the cases explored by Rasmussen, Davies, and others is that 
some of the characteristic differences of private law carry over into 
public law, in particular the towering presence of the legal academy 
in the German system, in contrast with what appears to have been a 
less important role in France and the Netherlands. 
 
 17. DAWSON, supra note 15, at xii−xiii. 
 18. See John Bell, Comparative Public Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE 
21ST CENTURY 235 (Andrew Harding & Esin Örucu eds., 2002) (providing a 
framework for comparative public law and remarking that “public law has a 
number of institutional features that make it a significantly different activity 
compared with private law”); Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of 
Comparative Law in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 
671, 680 (2002) (noting that comparative law is often criticized for, among other 
reasons, its “obsession with private law”). 
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In addition to providing a more complex account of the legal 
actors involved in constitutionalization, historical research has laid 
bare an important source of law that fueled and shaped the new 
constitutional order and that has, until recently, received relatively 
little attention in the scholarly debates—the domestic law of the 
member states. As explained above, according to the early legal 
scholarship and political science research, the principal source that 
served to establish the legal authority of the emerging constitutional 
order was the text of the Treaty and interpretation of that text through 
the teleological method.19 Recent historical research, however, has 
shown that members of the legal establishment, both at the national 
and supranational levels, drew not only on public international law, 
i.e. a treaty between sovereign states, but upon domestic sources of 
law to inspire their constitutional innovations. In exploring the 
origins of some of the key provisions on the design of the Court of 
Justice contained in the Treaty of Paris, and then the Treaty of Rome, 
Anne Boerger-de Smedt has shown that the drafters cut and pasted 
elements of French administrative law and German constitutional 
law in designing the heads of review, while they relied on Italian 
constitutional law in creating the preliminary reference system.20 
Karin van Leeuven documents the importance of Dutch 
constitutional reforms that firmly established the Netherlands as a 
monist system of international law for fueling the critical early 
litigation before the Court of Justice, and I have argued elsewhere 
that these monist concepts shaped the supranational doctrines of 
direct effect and supremacy.21 In his analysis of the German 
 
 19. Rasmussen, supra note 4, at 1205−06. 
 20. Anne Boerger-de Smedt, La Cour de Justice dans les négociations du traité 
de Paris instituant la CECA, 14 J. EUR. INTEGRATION HIST. 7 (2008) [hereinafter 
Boerger-de Smedt, La Cour de Justice]; Anne Boerger-De Smedt, Negotiating the 
Foundations of European Law, 1950-57: The Legal History of the Treaties of 
Paris and Rome, 21 CONT. EUR. HIST. 339, 346, 352 (2012) [hereinafter Boerger-
de Smedt, Negotiating the Foundations] (noting the impact of Magistrate Maurice 
Lagrange, who used his French administrative law background to influence the 
determination of the Court’s duties). 
 21. Karin van Leeuwen, On Democratic Concerns and Legal Traditions: The 
Dutch 1953 and 1956 Constitutional Reforms “Towards” Europe, 21 CONT. EUR. 
HIST. 357, 358 (2012) (demonstrating how Dutch constitutional reforms were 
instrumental in the development of European constitutional law because they 
established the primacy of international treaties and jurisprudence over national 
law, which ultimately paved the way for several Dutch preliminary references to 
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experience, Bill Davies shows in greater detail and far more 
persuasively than the earlier literature that the decision to incorporate 
fundamental rights, as well as the catalogue of such rights, was 
driven by the allegiance of German elites to their constitutional 
guarantees of fundamental rights.22 As Rasmussen puts it: “[historical 
research] has begun to explore how the national constitutional 
systems and legal cultures provided a constitutive framework—a 
fixed variety of options—for the development of European public 
law.”23 
This dimension of the new historical research contributes to yet 
another strand of comparative law scholarship, namely the study of 
legal transplants. The migration of law between jurisdictions has 
been a constant in legal history and is a pivotal theme in comparative 
scholarship, so much so that Alan Watson, in his seminal writing 
from the 1970s, calls it the only topic deserving of comparative 
research.24 In history, classic examples are the spread of the Civil 
Code on the French or German mold to Latin American, African, and 
Asian legal systems and the piecemeal incorporation of Roman law 
rules on matters such as divorce and the transfer of real property into 
both common and civil law systems.25 Comparative law has sought to 
demonstrate that legal systems are not hermetically sealed and self-
 
the European Court of Justice, including the Van Gend en Loos case); Francesca 
Bignami, Comparative Law and the Rise of the European Court of Justice (Mar. 3, 
2011) (unpublished paper for the biennial meeting of the European Union Studies 
Association) (on file with author). 
 22. DAVIES, supra note 10. 
 23. Rasmussen, supra note 4, at 1218. 
 24. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE 
LAW 9 (1974) (arguing that “boundaries of Comparative Law have been drawn too 
widely, and that they should define an area akin to that of comparative linguistics; 
that is, they should be concerned with similarities and differences in the context of 
a historical relationship”). 
 25. See Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and 
Receptions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 441, 445−51 
(Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006) (documenting the 
diffusion, often by force, of Roman law and the civil codes of France, Germany, 
and Switzerland in Europe and the rest of the world); see also WATSON, supra note 
24, at 22 (“The excerpts from the Civil Code of Spain showing basic contract rules 
equally valid in France, Chile, Columbia, Germany, Holland, Italy, Mexico, 
Portugal, and many other lands, and equally honored across eighteen or more 
centuries, offer a substantial challenge to the view that law reflects all the changes 
of changing economies and all the diversities of diverse civilizations.”). 
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contained and that, in addition to formally recognized sources of law, 
such as constitutions, statutes, and judicial precedent, it is necessary 
to include foreign law as a major and constant source of legal 
decisionmaking.  
The literature on transplants, in addition to documenting the extent 
of the phenomenon, has tackled two distinct questions: what explains 
the decision to borrow from another jurisdiction and, once a rule or 
collection of rules has been borrowed, what impact does the 
transplant have on the new legal system? The latter question has 
triggered a ferocious debate on the possibility, as well as the 
desirability, of borrowing. Some are of the opinion that transplants 
can never operate as intended and that the integrity of national 
systems should be defended against foreign imports,26 while others 
take a more sanguine view of what is seen to be an inevitable and 
creative mode of lawmaking and dispute resolution.27 Yet others 
assume the middle position that the success of transplants depends on 
whether the local circumstances exist in which foreign rules are 
likely to be fully understood and mobilized.28 On the first question 
concerning the causes of transplants, at least three pathways to legal 
transplants have been identified in the literature: imposition through 
military conquest or other forms of foreign domination; a relatively 
insular process, shielded from politics, of borrowing by legal 
 
 26. Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants,” 4 MAASTRICHT 
J. EUR. & COMP. L. 111, 122 (1997) (arguing that the theory that law can be 
transplanted or borrowed merely “reflects a faith in abstract universalism which is 
at odds with the observable decline of formal rationality and the correlative 
materialization of formal law characterized by the increasing prevalence of 
informative arguments of a sociological, economic, political, historical, cultural, 
epistemological or ethical, rather than conceptual nature”). 
 27. See WATSON, supra note 24, at 21 (remarking that legal transplants have 
been a common reality of legal systems for as long as legal history has been 
recorded); Alan Watson, Comparative Law and Legal Change, 37 CAMB. L.J. 313, 
315 (1978) (comparing laws to ideas, which will inevitably develop over time as 
they are transplanted into different societies); see also William Ewald, 
Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants, 43 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 489, 491 (1995) (arguing in favor of Watson’s theory of legal transplantation 
and noting that critics of his theory tend to misunderstand the structure of his 
argument). 
 28. See Daniel Berkowitz et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163, 
189 (2003) (arguing that the process of lawmaking, rather than the substantive 
content of the laws transplanted, determines whether the laws adopted by a 
particular society will be effective). 
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professionals seeking to solve problems authoritatively by drawing 
on the prestige of the foreign model; and the strategic adaptation by 
national governments to the legal rules advocated by international 
economic institutions in an effort to qualify for international loans, 
attract foreign capital, and participate in the global marketplace.29  
The new historical research contributes to the transplant literature 
by documenting the phenomenon in the relatively novel domain of 
supranational law and by shedding some light on the causal question 
with evidence on the incentives and actors that prompted the transfer 
of elements of domestic law into supranational law. As suggested by 
the examples above, most of the research on transplants has 
examined the horizontal transfer of rules and models between 
national legal systems. To the extent that the literature considers the 
impact of international law, it has focused on the downwards transfer 
of law into national systems as a consequence of international 
agreements or other forms of international pressure and the extent to 
which reception has been successful or unsuccessful. Comparative 
law has generally neglected to analyze the upward transfer of 
domestic rules and models into the legal frameworks of regional and 
international systems of governance. The new historical research 
breaks ground by focusing on upward transplants and by 
demonstrating the importance of domestic legal rules in inspiring the 
institutional framework of the emerging supranational legal system 
of European governance. Moreover, with the globalization of law 
and politics, this form of transplantation can be expected to become 
increasingly common, and therefore historical research on the 
European case can be expected to have relevance for tracing the 
genesis of the numerous systems of international courts and 
lawmaking that have come afterwards. 
Turning to the reasons for supranational transplants, perhaps not 
surprisingly given the different context, none of the three pathways 
identified in the comparative law literature appears to have been at 
work. Foreign domination and international economic institutions 
obviously have no explanatory purchase on the European experience. 
At first blush, an explanation that draws on legal problem-solving 
 
 29. See Graziadei, supra note 25, at 456−61 (noting that discussing these 
factors is useful for comparative law to understand the uniformity of legal 
practices). 
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based on the prestige of certain foreign models and insulated from 
political pressure appears more promising. Yet at least the historical 
account of what motivated the design of the Court of Justice in the 
founding treaties, on which the archival records are relatively 
complete, does not support this explanation. Rather, it suggests that 
domestic legal rules served as a convenient toolbox from which 
supranational institutional designers could opportunistically pick and 
choose, depending on their political or ideological aims, without 
regard for the opinion of the legal community, domestic or 
otherwise, as to the prestige and authority of those transplanted rules.  
Anne Boerger-de Smedt has thoroughly analyzed the historical 
background of the key provisions of the Court of Justice in the 
founding treaties.30 In many respects, the Court of Justice mimics the 
principal French administrative court, the Council of State. Without 
knowing the history, one might speculate that once the drafters 
decided to create a supranational administration, they also felt the 
necessity of guaranteeing some form of judicial review, as existed in 
all the member states, at which point the legal experts tasked with 
drafting the specific treaty provisions copied the prestigious French 
model, which not only had a long and distinguished pedigree but also 
had been the object of earlier transplants in most of the other member 
states (Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). One might 
also expect that the French delegation, given its origins, was the most 
convinced of the authority and prestige of the French model. 
However, perhaps because the legal experts responsible for drafting 
were under a tight leash from their political principals, this logic did 
not drive the negotiations.  
As the historical evidence reviewed by Boerger-de Smedt reveals, 
the French delegation was the main opponent of judicial review, 
including many features of the French model. The French delegation 
initially opposed establishing any permanent court, for fear that full-
fledged judicial review would undermine the powers and 
prerogatives of the High Authority.31 Instead, the German and 
 
 30. See generally Boerger-de Smedt, La Cour de Justice, supra note 20; 
Boerger-de Smedt, Negotiating the Foundations, supra note 20. 
 31. Boerger-de Smedt, Negotiating the Foundations, supra note 20, at 345−47 
(explaining that Lagrange was appointed to make the Court resemble a “simple 
[French] administrative court” and that other countries strongly opposed 
Lagrange’s plans “because Lagrange’s proposals ignored previous compromises 
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Benelux delegations were the main proponents of a permanent court, 
the German delegation because of its federalist inclinations and the 
Benelux delegation because it sought to protect state sovereignty and 
national interests against an overly powerful High Authority. 
Moreover, even after the French model emerged as the compromise 
position, the delegations demonstrated a willingness to tinker with 
that model in line with their political preferences without much 
regard for the prestige of the French system. Most extraordinarily 
from a transplant perspective, the French delegation would have 
transposed only three out of the four heads of review that were 
routinely applied by their Council of State (error of form, misuse of 
power, and incompetence, but not violation of the law) in an attempt 
to preserve the High Authority’s administrative discretion and limit 
the powers of the Court of Justice.32 It was only on the prodding of 
the federalist German delegation, which sought to establish a 
supranational rule-of-law system, that the Court was also given the 
power to review administrative acts for violations of the law.  
Later, in the Treaty of Rome, when the institutional framework of 
the Court of Justice was subject to renegotiation in light of the 
experience of the European Coal and Steel Community, the national 
legal experts on the drafting committee were again motivated by the 
political preferences of their governments. Because individual 
litigation was perceived as unduly interfering with the activities of 
the High Authority, the standing rule was narrowed to bar individual 
challenges to generally applicable regulations, representing another 
departure from the French model.33 Moreover, on those issues on 
which the legal experts were allowed some leeway by their political 
principals, it appears that they were driven by a combination of 
federalist ideology and what was thought to be politically feasible 
rather than the prestige and authority of the national transplant. The 
prime example of this was the preliminary reference system. The 
 
and weakened the judicial protection”). 
 32. For a classic explanation of the French system of review for “excess of 
power” that existed at the time and the four principal heads of review covered by 
“excess of power,” see MAURICE HAURIOU, PRÉCIS DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF ET 
DE DROIT PUBLIC 439 (6th ed. 1907). 
 33. See also Michel Fromont, L’influence du Droit Francais et du Droit 
Allemand Sur Les Conditions de Recevabilité du Recours en Annulation Devant la 
Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes, 2 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE 
DROIT EUROPÉEN 47, 61−64 (1966). 
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drafters copied the Italian system of lower-court referrals of 
constitutional questions to the Constitutional Court not because of 
any recognized superiority of the foreign model—the Italian 
Constitutional Court had just barely come into existence—but 
because it furthered the federalist ideology of certain legal experts on 
the drafting committee. 
In sum, the legal history of the treaties suggests that national law 
served as a source of inspiration for European law more because of 
the limits of human imagination and the fact that national law 
presented a readily available set of options, rather than because the 
drafters held it in particularly high regard. The logic of convenience, 
as opposed to prestige and authority, is underscored by the 
willingness of the French delegation in the first instance to do 
without an administrative court entirely and, in the second instance, 
to omit some of the most important features of the French model. It 
may well be that the explanation for supranational transplants in the 
case law of the European Court of Justice, with legal principles such 
as fundamental rights, is different and is driven less by political 
expedience and more by the merits of the transplant in the eyes of the 
legal community. In contrast with treaty negotiations, which 
represent moments of high politics, the activity of courts is generally 
less politically salient and, by virtue of the principle of judicial 
independence, courts enjoy greater insulation than expert committees 
from politicians. Transplants in judge-made law, therefore, might 
very well adhere more closely to the authority explanation in the 
general transplant literature since judicial decisionmaking is likely to 
be driven more by standards internal to the law and the legal 
profession. The question of what motivates transplants in 
supranational courts remains a promising avenue for future research. 
III. EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY AND THE 
CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ORDER 
Moving from past to present, Morten Rasmussen and Bill Davies 
have suggested that the recent historical research has implications for 
how the European legal order should be conceptualized today.34 
Although they are careful not to overstate their case, they suggest 
 
 34. See Bill Davies & Morten Rasmussen, Towards a New History of European 
Law, 21 CONT. EUR. HIST. 305, 308−09 (2012); see also Rasmussen, supra note 4. 
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that since the rise of a constitutional practice was more contested and 
contingent than originally believed, the foundations of the current 
legal order are insecure and the constitutional characterization, 
namely that it approximates a federal legal system, overblown. There 
is no doubt that legal historians have dispensed with the aura of 
inevitability that pervades much of the early legal scholarship and 
neo-functionalist theories of legal integration in political science.35 
By exposing how divided the Court was initially, how the 
constitutional turn depended on the strategic and concerted 
mobilization of a variety of legal and political actors, and how 
national elites opposed the supremacy of European law in the 1960s 
and the 1970s, historical research has demonstrated that 
constitutionalism was only one of many possible frames for 
European law and that the principal competing frame—public 
international law—was equally possible.  
Whether today, however, the member states have accepted or 
rejected the constitutional revolution is another question. After all, 
the constitutions of many nation states were heavily contested at the 
time of their adoption and for decades thereafter, and nevertheless 
today their law is considered constitutional in the sense that it is 
recognized as binding and authoritative and is routinely applied by 
courts.36 Although, as Rasmussen says, historical research has 
demonstrated that the constitutional revolution had a very limited 
impact on the member states in the 1960s and the 1970s, it does not 
indicate whether this is still true today. To assess this claim, 
therefore, I look outside of the history literature to explore some of 
the recent challenges to the constitutional paradigm and to consider 
the evidence that exists on the relative merits of the constitutional 
paradigm over the principal alternative, namely public international 
law.  
To begin the discussion, it is fitting to repeat what is meant by 
constitutionalization in the literature on European integration. The 
term has not been used to claim that there is a foundational 
document, similar to the U.S. Constitution or the French 
Constitution, in which a European people has recognized that it 
 
 35. See Rasmussen, supra note 4. 
 36. One example is the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic. See RENÉ 
RÉMOND, LE RETOUR DE DE GAULLE (1958). 
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constitutes a single, self-governing community and has set down the 
rules for the collective governance of their community. Rather, 
constitutionalization refers to the system that has emerged for the 
application and enforcement of European law. The claim is that this 
system has come to resemble more closely a federal legal order than 
one established under public international law by a treaty among 
sovereign states because the rules generated by the system do not 
simply bind nations in their dealings with one another but take effect 
within their legal systems: national courts routinely apply European 
law and, in the event of conflicts with national law, give precedence 
to European law, and disputes are regularly and authoritatively 
settled in the last instance by the European Court of Justice. 
Constitutionalization includes both a doctrinal and empirical 
component. The Court of Justice has announced a number of legal 
doctrines that give rise to the duty to apply European law and submit 
to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. As Rasmussen explains, 
the most prominent ones are direct effect and supremacy, but they 
also include the law on the preliminary reference system and the 
obligation of national courts to refer questions to the Court of Justice, 
rights of access to national courts to litigate European law, and the 
remedies to be awarded by national courts should a violation of 
European law be found.37 Empirically, constitutionalization asserts 
that practice followed doctrine and that national legal actors, 
principally courts, have come to routinely apply European law and 
recognize the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. 
There have been two types of challenges to the 
constitutionalization claim: one is focused on the theoretical 
doctrinal architecture and the other on the legal practice. Over the 
past decade, a number of legal scholars have challenged the 
theoretical vision of the European constitutional order as a 
hierarchical system in which European law ranks above the law of 
the member states, i.e. direct effect and supremacy, and the Court of 
Justice is supreme and has the final word on any conflicts between 
national and European law, i.e. the preliminary reference system.38 
 
 37. PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND 
MATERIALS (5th ed. 2011). 
 38. See, e.g., Daniel Halberstam, Local, Global and Plural Constitutionalism: 
Europe Meets the World, in THE WORLDS OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 150, 
202 (J.HH. Weiler & Grainne de Burca eds., 2012) (preferring primacy to 
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Constitutional pluralism, as this line of scholarship is generally 
known, posits a European constitutional order of multiple competing 
claims to final authority, between national constitutions and the 
founding treaties and between the European Court of Justice and 
national constitutional courts, and seeks to develop a set of 
normatively desirable legal principles and standards of reasoning that 
can legitimately be used by courts to manage and reconcile such 
conflicts. The empirical trigger for most of this literature is the 
Maastricht Judgment of 1992, in which the German Constitutional 
Court ruled that it, not the European Court of Justice, bore final 
responsibility for policing the boundaries between supranational and 
national competences and keeping the European Union within the 
limits of the powers conferred in founding treaties.39 This case, 
similar to the earlier German resistance based on fundamental rights 
narrated by Bill Davies, has given rise to the very real possibility of 
constitutional conflicts between different hierarchies of norms and 
between national courts and the European Court of Justice. 
Constitutional pluralism takes on the challenge of developing a 
theory of constitutional law that can accommodate this system of 
competing legal authority, which flies in the face of conventional 
theories of law and hierarchy, and seeks to devise a principled 
normative framework capable of resolving the conflicts inherent in a 
system that lacks what legal positivists would call a single rule of 
 
supremacy, as it would allow legal perspectives from outside the European Union); 
see also Miguel Poiares Maduro, Three Claims of Constitutional Pluralism, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND 67, 68 
(Matej Avbelj & Jan Komárek eds., 2012) (arguing that constitutional pluralism is 
better equipped to solve conflicts of authority than is the doctrine of supremacy); 
Matthias Kumm, Rethinking Constitutional Authority, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
PLURALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND 39, 39 (Matej Avbelj & Jan 
Komárek eds., 2012) (“It is widely recognized that European constitutional 
practice has a pluralist structure. The legal orders of Member States are not 
hierarchically integrated into the European legal orders. Instead, from the point of 
view of Member States’ highest courts, the status of European Union law is a 
matter to be determined with reference to national constitutional norms.”); Neil 
Walker, Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Global Context, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
PLURALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND 17, 17−19 (Matej Avbelj & Jan 
Komark eds., 2012) (explaining the impetus behind the rise of the pluralism 
argument to explain the transnational nature of law but to maintain the idea of 
distinct constitutional singularities). 
 39. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 
12, 1993, 69(2) C.M.L.R. 57 (Ger.). 
  
1330 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [28:5 
recognition and a single rule of adjudication.40  
Although the possibility of a legal system without clear lines of 
authority is theoretically intriguing and represents one of the most 
vibrant areas of contemporary legal scholarship, it should be stressed 
that neither legal pluralists nor the national constitutional law from 
which they draw their inspiration reject all or indeed most of the 
features of the doctrinal architecture that has been progressively 
erected by the Court of Justice over the years. To give but one 
example, supremacy, direct effect, and the duty to refer interpretive 
questions to the Court of Justice are accepted in all cases in German 
constitutional law except for those instances in which there is a 
strong argument that there has been a violation of the Basic Law.41 
Pursuant to these principles, in the early 1980s, the German 
Constitutional Court scolded the highest German tax court for failing 
to give direct effect to a European Directive or, in the alternative, in 
the face of doubts over direct effect, for failing to refer the 
interpretive question to the European Court of Justice.42 
In addition, what bothers constitutional pluralists is not the actual 
existence of constitutional conflict but the possibility of such 
conflicts between competing judicial and normative hierarchies and 
the implications of this possibility for theories of law and what it 
means to be a legal system. They do not take a position on whether 
national courts, as a matter of practice, routinely apply European law 
and heed the judgments of the Court of Justice. In fact, part of the 
fascination of the subject is that the European legal system can 
function, and conflicts can be avoided, without a definitive hierarchy 
of sources and institutions. Put somewhat differently, as the label of 
constitutional pluralism suggests, this line of scholarship generally 
takes the view that the European legal order is thicker than ordinary 
international law and therefore merits the designation of 
 
 40. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed., 1994) 
(describing rules of recognition as rules necessary to understand primary rules, and 
rules of adjudication as rules necessary for understanding if a rule has been 
breached and how to prescribe an enforceable remedy). 
 41. Bundersverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 
29, 1974, INTERNATIONALE HANDELSGESELLSCHAFT (Solange I), 37 BVerfGE 271 
(Ger.). 
 42. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 
8, 1987, 75 BVerGE 223 (Ger.). This history is recounted in GEORGE BERMANN ET 
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW 304−05 (2d ed. 2002). 
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“constitutional” but that the doctrinal architecture established by the 
Court of Justice is an incomplete and, in some respects, misleading 
account of how the legal system operates. 
Indeed, looking at the actual practice of constitutional courts, the 
pluralist threat appears quite remote, as outright conflict with the 
European Court of Justice has been systematically averted. Although 
a number of constitutional courts have called into question the 
hierarchical nature of the European legal system, in the interest of 
brevity, this discussion will focus exclusively on the German case. 
Even though the German Constitutional Court signaled its opposition 
to the Court of Justice as far back as 1974, with the Solange 
judgment, it has never actually ruled a European measure to be in 
breach of the German Basic Law.43 In some cases, it has avoided 
directly challenging the authority of European law by deliberately 
ruling on the legality of national implementing measures rather than 
the European legislation pursuant to which the implementing 
measure enacted. For instance, in a case challenging the EU Data 
Retention Directive, which required that telecommunications data be 
retained for law enforcement purposes, the Constitutional Court 
found that the German implementing law, not the Directive, 
breached the German right to informational self-determination by 
mandating an excessively long retention period and by failing to 
narrowly delineate the circumstances under which the police would 
have access to the data.44  
In other cases, the Constitutional Court has upheld German 
ratification of European treaties, and therefore has allowed European 
cooperation to go forward, but has imposed conditions on how 
European law is to be interpreted in order to satisfy German 
constitutional requirements. For example, the Court recently was 
faced with a challenge to German ratification of the European 
Stability Mechanism Treaty, which established a permanent bailout 
fund to assist indebted Euro countries.45 The Court rejected the 
 
 43. Bundersverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 
29, 1974, INTERNATIONALE HANDELSGESELLSCHAFT (Solange I), 37 BVerfGE 271 
(Ger.). 
 44. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 2 
Mar. 2010, 121 BVerfGE 1 (Ger.). 
 45. BVerfG, Extracts from the Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 
12 September 2012, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT (Ger.), available at 
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challenge but found that democratic rights and procedures 
guaranteed under the German Basic Law were implicated, and 
therefore it set down a number of conditions for the operation of the 
European Stability Mechanism, including a prohibition on borrowing 
directly from the European Central Bank.46 Thus we see that the 
Constitutional Court has sought to shape European law without 
seeking to displace it, giving effect to European legal commitments 
at the same time as it vindicates German constitutional principles.  
A second type of challenge to the constitutional paradigm points to 
the disconnect between the legal theory of direct effect, supremacy, 
and all the other pieces of the federalist legal architecture and the 
empirical realities of litigation and legal practice in the member 
states. Looking past constitutional courts to the mass of adjudication 
that occurs at the lower levels of the judiciary, Lisa Conant has 
documented the variable and patchy enforcement of European legal 
rules, together with a reluctance to submit to the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Justice through the preliminary reference procedure.47 
However, even though Conant points to significant shortcomings of 
the legal system, other evidence is more promising for the 
constitutional paradigm. The number of preliminary references 
reaching the Court of Justice has steadily increased over the years. 
Indeed, there has been talk of reforming the Court’s procedure to 
reduce the burden of the preliminary reference caseload, something 
that was unthinkable in the early decades of legal integration, when 
the Court did everything possible to encourage recalcitrant national 
courts to submit to its jurisdiction.48 Moreover, it is fairly clear that 
knowledge of European law is more diffuse than it was even two 
decades ago and that the legal establishment in most places is 
reasonably conversant with European law. This stands in marked 
contrast with the 1960s and 1970s, when, as the new historical 




 46. Id. at 149−51. 
 47. LISA CONANT, JUSTICE CONTAINED 15, 42 (2002). 
 48. EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, THE WORKLOAD OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE 
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2010-1, H.L. 128 ¶¶ 97−117 (U.K.) (encouraging 
national courts to adopt the policy but rejecting the idea of making the practice 
compulsory). 
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European integration were an embattled minority.49  
The transmission of European law in the member states today 
takes many forms. While in the 1980s, the law of the then-European 
Communities was still an optional part of the university curriculum, 
today it is mandatory in most places.50 The same is true of the 
specialized training for judges that in many countries follows 
university studies.51 In each of the member states, there exists an 
ample array of textbooks, treatises, legal journals, and other 
professional publications that lay bare the field and track the most 
recent developments in European law. The judgments of the 
European Court of Justice are published and analyzed in a number of 
scholarly venues, and in those legal traditions in which codes and 
scholarly commentary are the principal source of law, there exist 
competing compilations of the European treaties, commented article 
by article by leading scholars.52 The transnational networks of 
national lawyers and academics devoted to propagating and shaping 
European law have also proliferated and have become increasingly 
specialized, with different groups devoted to administrative 
procedure,53 criminal justice,54 immigration law,55 and other topics. In 
 
 49. See, e.g., Davies & Rasmussen, supra note 34, at 308−09, 313 (describing 
how pro-integration jurists faced serious resistance from Gaullist France). 
 50. See, e.g., Herbert Hausmaninger, Austrian Legal Education, 45 S. TEX. L 
REV. 387, 393 (2002) (placing law of the European Union in the third semester of 
Austrian legal education); see also Marie-Luce Paris & Lawrence Donnelly, Legal 
Education in Ireland: A Paradigm Shift to the Practical?, 11 GERMAN L.J. 1067, 
1074 (2010) (requiring students to take, among other courses, Law of the European 
Union for barristers to hold a degree in Irish law); Axel C. Filges, Remarks at the 
Opening of the Symposium Celebrating the 10th Anniversary of the German Law 
Journal – German Federal Bar (BRAK), 10 GERMAN L.J. 1305, 1305 (2009) 
(stating that European law is mandatory in German legal education because 
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 51. See, e.g., Programme Pédagogique de la Promo 2012, ECOLE NATIONALE 
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direction de Philippe Léger (2000). 
 53. See, e.g., RESEARCH NETWORK ON EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW [RENEUAL], 
http://www.reneual.eu (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) (seeking to simplify and create 
further transparency for EU administrative law). 
 54. See, e.g., EUROPEAN CRIMINAL LAW ACADEMIC NETWORK [ECLAN], 
http://www.eclan.eu (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) (collecting research on EU 
criminal law). 
 55. See, e.g., The Academic Network for Legal Studies on Immigration and 
  
1334 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [28:5 
sum, there can be no doubt that the judges, civil servants, lawyers, 
and scholars who write ministerial circulars, law review articles, 
briefs, and judicial opinions have a better grasp of European law and 
therefore are more likely than their predecessors to invoke the rights 
and duties of European law.  
In conclusion, once the constitutional critique is carefully analyzed 
and the countervailing evidence considered, the European 
constitutional order appears to be on fairly solid ground. The 
constitutional paradigm might not perfectly capture the theory and 
practice of European law, but neither does the main alternative 
paradigm of international law. The question is not whether the 
European legal system mimics a federal legal order but whether it 
approximates more closely a domestic or international legal system. 
Is the role of European law in domestic courts more analogous to, 
say, the application of articles of the Civil Code and the related 
jurisprudence or to the application of the provisions of the WTO’s 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and to national enforcement 
of judgments of the International Court of Justice? On the whole, it 
appears to come closer to the former model.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Recent historical research on the origins of the European 
constitutional order has afforded numerous invaluable insights into 
the roots of what is the most highly developed supranational legal 
system in existence today. In particular, two achievements of the 
recent historiography stand out, both for their contribution to the 
theory of European legal integration and to the discipline of 
comparative law more generally speaking. First, recent historical 
research has demonstrated the importance of executive branch 
lawyers, legal academics, and the organized bar in creating the 
normative discourse of European law. Second, the new legal history 
of the treaties and the case law underscores the importance of 
national law as a crucial source of inspiration for European law. 
These two insights have significantly advanced our understanding of 
how the European legal system actually came into being, dispelling 
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long-standing functionalist myths and hindsight-based narratives, 
and can inform the debates in the field of comparative law.  
At the same time, stressing that the origins of important aspects of 
the constitutionalization of Europe were much more contested and 
contingent than originally believed does not in itself provide 
sufficient grounds for inferring that the current status of the 
European constitutional legal order is uncertain. Theoretically, there 
do not appear to be grounds for this claim: a large body of research 
on path dependence in economics,56 sociology,57 and political 
science58 in the past quarter century has shown that many resilient 
institutional systems have been put on self-reinforcing paths by 
contingent events and highly contested beginnings. Although in 
principle any institutional arrangement is open to reversal, what this 
large literature shows is that institutional vulnerability does not 
depend on the degree of contestation at the origins. In the case of the 
European Union, the evidence is mixed, and the jury is out, but the 
supporters of a constitutionalist interpretation are probably closer to 
capturing the real nature of the European legal order than those who 
consider it just another version of international law.  
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